Eco L3 - Globalization, Inequality, and Redistribution

Lecture 9: Unilateral vs. multilateral approaches to international tax reform

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
Roadmap

- Multilateral approaches: what has been tried?
- The global minimum tax: a revolution?
- Unilateral approaches

1 Multilateral approaches

1.1 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting

- OECD initiative started in 2015 to harmonize and fix inconsistencies in tax laws
- E.g., end of "double Irish" scheme (since 2020), popular with US tech multinationals



Global corporate tax revenue loss due to profit shifting to tax havens


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2 Minimum taxation

- 2022 international agreement on 15% minimum country-by-country corporate tax for multinationals ("Pillar 2")
- Implementation starting 2024 in the EU, UK, Japan etc.
- Plan endorsed by Biden administration in Spring 2021 (pushing for minimum tax rate of 21%) but not passed by US Congress

Pillar 2: ending or embracing tax competition? Two main issues:

- Carve-out for substance: 8% of tangible assets + 10% of payroll can be excluded \rightarrow encourages firms to move activities to low-tax places with real production
- \bullet Refundable tax credits not counted as reduction in taxes paid \rightarrow new form of tax competition on tax credits?




Source: Global Tax Evasion Report 2024


2.1 The pitfalls of unanimity

Q: why are international agreements disappointing? A: Tax havens have no interest in ending the race-to-the-bottom

- With tax competition, revenue-maximizing corporate rate τ^* is low for small countries, \approx 5%.
- Havens with $\tau \approx \tau^*$ generate large tax revenue at the expense of other countries (and to the benefit of global shareholders)
- Insisting on global agreements (or unanimity in EU context) means carving tax competition into stone, fueling inequality



Source: Tørsløv et al. 2023




Corporate tax revenue collected & tax rate on shifted profits

Source: Tørsløv et al. 2023

Figure 2.6

Corporate income tax revenue per capita (€ 2022)



Source: Global Tax Evasion Report 2024

3 Unilateral approaches

3.1 Formula apportionment

- Tax base in country i based on shares of global sales, assets, and/or payroll made in i
- Used by US states for their own corporate taxes
- Key attraction: eliminates the opportunity for companies to engage in profit shifting

- Sales only apportionment removes incentives to move K abroad
- Underlying the OECD's Pillar 1, but unlikely to be implemented
- Other formulas could be used: population, users... (all multinationals benefit from global knowledge, emit carbon that harm the planet, etc.) → taking the interest of developing countries seriously

3.2 Unilateral collection of tax deficits

- Any number of countries could chose to collect the taxes that tax havens refuse to collect
- ... playing the role of tax collector of last resort
- ... making it pointless for firms to book profits in tax havens
- See EU Tax Observatory report #1 (Barake, Chouc, Neef, and Zucman, 2021) for simulations on corporate tax, and Global Tax Evasion Report 2024

Logic can be implemented broadly, not only to corporate tax but also to wealth taxation

- Any country can implement minimum tax on wealth
- Then collect part of taxes other countries choose not to collect (bas on time spent, location of assets, market shares...)

 \rightarrow Key to change the dynamic of global tax competition, and reconcile globalization with tax justice