## Wealth Inequality in the United States since 1913

Emmanuel Saez (UC Berkeley) Gabriel Zucman (LSE)

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### Introduction


US Income inequality has increased sharply since the 1970s Mixed existing evidence on wealth inequality changes

 $\Rightarrow$  Is inequality increase driven solely by labor income?

We capitalize income tax return data to estimate new annual series of US wealth concentration since 1913


**Key result:** Wealth inequality has surged but phenomenon is concentrated mostly within the top .1% (=wealth above \$20m)

### U-Shaped Wealth Concentration



This figure depicts the share of total household wealth held by the 0.1% richest families, as estimated by capitalizing income tax returns. In 2012, the top 0.1% includes about 160,000 families with net wealth above \$20.6 million. Source: Appendix Table B1.

## Surge in top wealth shares concentrated in top 0.1%



### Outline of the talk

- I. The capitalization method
- II. The distribution of wealth
- III. Robustness and comparison with existing estimates
- IV. Decomposing wealth accumulation: income and saving rates

### I- The capitalization method

## To obtain wealth, we divide capital income by the rate of return

#### How the capitalization technique works:

Start from each capital income component reported on individual tax returns

Compute **aggregate** rate of return for each asset class (using Flow of Funds and aggregate tax data)

Multiply each individual capital income component by  $1/\mbox{rate}$  of return of corresponding asset class

Simple idea, but lot of care needed in reconciling tax with Flow of Funds data

Key assumption: uniform return within asset class

 $\Rightarrow$  Need detailed income components to obtain reliable results

### Aggregate income and wealth

### Aggregate wealth

W = Total assets minus liabilities of households at market value

Excludes durables, unfunded DB pensions, non-profits

Source: Flow of Funds since 1945, Goldsmith, Wolff (1989), Kopczuk and Saez (2004) before

#### Aggregate income


NIPA since 1929, Kuznets (1941) and King (1930) before 1929

▶ returns

#### Family unit

Top 1% = Top 1% of all family units [as in Piketty and Saez]

### A U-shaped wealth-income ratio



### Distributional data: income tax returns

### Consistent, annual, high quality data since 1913:

Composition tabulations by size of income 1913-

IRS micro-files with oversampling of the top 1962-

Various additional IRS published stats (estates, IRAs, trusts, foundations)


#### Detailed income categories:

Dividends, interest (+ tax exempt since 1987), rents, unincorporated business profits (S corporations, partnerships, sole prop.), royalties, realized capital gains, etc.

#### A lot of income "flows to" individual income tax returns

Mutual funds, S corporations, partnerships, holding companies, trusts, etc.

## Concentration of reported capital income has increased dramatically



The top 0.1% taxable capital income share

## How we deal with non-taxable components

#### **Owner-occupied housing**

Home values set proportional to property tax paid

Home mortgages set proportional to mortgage interest paid

We assume (based on SCF) that itemizers have 75% of home wealth and 80% of home mortgages

#### Pensions

Pension wealth set proportional to pension distributions and wages above 50th percentile

Consistent with SCF and with direct information on IRA wealth from IRS (IRAs  $\approx$  30% of pension wealth)

#### ₩

Only matters for top 10% but irrelevant for top 1% and above, because pensions and housing very small there

### How we deal with avoidance and evasion

### Tax avoidance:

Systematic reconciliation exercise with national accounts to identify potential gaps in tax data

E.g., trust income  $\rightarrow$  imputations on the basis of distributions (Retained trust income  $\approx 2\%$  of household capital income)

#### Tax evasion:

Third-party reporting means all dividends and interest earned through domestic banks are reported

Offshore wealth: If anything increases the trend in rising wealth top wealth shares by about 2 points **constant** 

### Is the return constant within asset class?

### Two potential issues:


Maybe the very rich have higher equity/bond returns (e.g., better at spotting good investment opportunities)  $\rightarrow$  level bias

Maybe this differential has increased since the 1970s (e.g., due to financial globalization/innovation)  $\rightarrow$  trend bias


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## Two checks show that return within asset class is flat and has remained flat

## Check 1: No evidence that the wealthy have higher returns within asset class



## The very rich did collect a lot of dividends in the 1970s



## Check 2: The capitalization method works for SCF and foundations

Capitalization method can be checked with joint income and wealth micro-data:

**1) SCF Data:** provides individual micro-data for both wealth and (tax return) income component by component since 1989


**2)** Foundation Data: publicly available IRS micro-data with information on both market value wealth and income

We apply same rates of returns & capitalization technique as for individual tax returns

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
By capitalizing income we are able to reproduce the correct wealth distribution

### Capitalization method works for the SCF



pensions and owner-occupied net housing. Source: Appendix Table C1.

### Capitalization works for foundations



# II- The US Wealth Distribution, 1913-2012

### Wealth in 2012 is very concentrated

Table 1: Thresholds and average wealth in top wealth groups, 2012

Wealth group	Number of families	Wealth threshold	Average wealth	Wealth share
A. Top Wealth Groups				
Full Population	160,700,000		\$343,000	100%
Top 10%	16,070,000	\$660,000	\$2,560,000	77.2%
Top 1%	1,607,000	\$3,960,000	\$13,840,000	41.8%
Top 0.1%	160,700	\$20,600,000	\$72,800,000	22.0%
Top .01%	16,070	\$111,000,000	\$371,000,000	11.2%
B. Intermediate Wealth Groups				
Bottom 90%	144,600,000		\$84,000	22.8%
Top 10-1%	14,463,000	\$660,000	\$1,310,000	35.4%
Top 1-0.1%	1,446,300	\$3,960,000	\$7,290,000	19.8%
Top 0.1-0.01%	144,600	\$20,600,000	\$39,700,000	10.8%
Top .01%	16,070	\$111,000,000	\$371,000,000	11.2%

### Wealth inequality is making a comeback

### Main long-run trends in the distribution of wealth:

Long run U-shaped evolution for the very rich (top 0.1%: >\$20 million today)

Long run L-shaped evolution for the rich (top 1% to 0.1%: between \$4 million and 20 million today)

Long-run ∩-shaped for the middle-class (top 50% to 90%: less than \$650K today)


(Memo: Bottom 50% always owns  $\approx$  0 net wealth)

### Wealth has always been concentrated




Top 10% wealth share in the United States, 1917-2012


### Top 1% has gained more than top 10%




### Top 1% surge is due to the top 0.1%




### Top 0.01% share: $\times$ 4 in last 35 years




### The rise and fall of middle-class wealth



## Wealth is getting older, but at the very top remains younger than in the '60s-'70s



## Share of income and labor income of top wealth holders has grown a lot



Share of income earned by top 0.1% wealth-holders

This figure shows the share of total pre-tax national income and pre-tax labor income earned by top 0.1% wealth-holders. Labor income includes employee compensation and the labor component of business income. Source: Appendix Tables B25 and B28.

# III- Robustness and comparison with existing estimates

## Findings are robust to different methodological choices

#### **Robustness checks:**

Different treatment of capital gains

Capitalizing dividends only (Bill Gates world)

Capitalizing dividends plus capital gains (Warren Buffet world)

Capitalizing dividends plus capital gains for shares but not ranking (the best of both worlds)

Allowing for bond yield rising with wealth

Different imputations for pension wealth

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All show wealth inequalities rising fast at the very top, but not below the top 0.1%

### Results robust to alternative treatment of pensions, capital gains, bond returns




Figure B27: Top 0.1% wealth share, all methods

## Link with previous studies using alternative data

Forbes 400 rich list: large increase in wealth concentration

**Surveys**: SCF shows increase in top 10% but less in top 1% SCF excludes Forbes 400 and under-estimates capital income concentration increases since 1989


**Estate tax multiplier**: No increase in top 1% wealth share since 1980s (Kopczuk-Saez 2004, SOI studies)

Estate tax multiplier method fails to take into account widening mortality differential by wealth class

Our capitalization analysis can help SCF weights and estate multiplier weights

 $\parallel$ 


### Our estimate for top 0.01% is consistent with Forbes rankings



Forbes 400 (top .00025%) and top .01% Wealth Shares


The figure depicts the top .00025% wealth share as estimated from the Forbes 400 list on the left axis. For comparison, the figure reports our top 0.01% wealth share obtained by capitalizing income tax returns (on the right axis). Source: Appendix Table C3.

## Estate tax returns fail to capture rising top wealth shares



The figure depicts the top 0.1% wealth share obained by capitalizing income, by using the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF baseline and adjusted), and by using estate tax data (Kopczuk and Saez, 2004). Source: Appendix C4 and C4b.


## SCF does not fully capture rising top capital income share




Top 0.1% Capital Income Share in the SCF and Tax Data

The figure compares the top 0.1% capital income shares estimated with the SCF data vs. the income tax data. Capital income includes realized capital gains, dividends, interest, net rents, and business profits. Source: Appendix Table C2.


# Estate multiplier issue: mortality gradient by wealth within top 10%





The figure depicts the relative mortality rate by age and wealth group for men in 1999-2008. E.g., male top 1% wealth holders aged 30-49 mortality rate is 40% of males aged 30-49 population wide. Kopczuk-Saez is based on the mortality of white college goers relative to population in the 1980s. The graph shows that mortality decreases with wealth (even within the top 10%) and that the wealth mortality advantage decreases with age. Source: Appendix Table C7.

#### Estate multiplier issue: mortality gradient by wealth widens over time




Evolution of Mortality Advantage, Men, Aged 65-79

The figure depicts the relative mortality rate for men aged 65-79 by wealth group and period. E.g., male top 1% wealth holders aged 65-79 mortality rate is 90% of males aged 65-79 population wide in 1979-1984. Kopczuk-Saez is based on the mortality of white college goers relative to population in the 1980s. The graph shows that the wealth mortality advantage increases overtime and more so for the top 1% wealthiest. Source: Appendix Figure C7.

#### IV- Decomposing Wealth Accumulation: Saving Rates and Income Shares of Top Wealth Holders

#### Top 1% vs. bottom 90% wealth growth



#### Wealth distribution Dynamics

Individual *i* wealth accumulation can always be written:

$$W_{t+1}^i = (1+q_t^i) \cdot (W_t^i + s_t^i \cdot Y_t^i)$$

where  $W_t^i$  is wealth,  $Y_t^i$  is income,  $s_t^i$  is net savings rate,  $1 + q_t^i$  is pure price effect on assets in year t

We define **synthetic** savings rate  $s_t^p$  for fractile p (e.g., top 1%):


$$W^{
ho}_{t+1} = (1+q^{
ho}_t)\cdot (W^{
ho}_t+s^{
ho}_t\cdot Y^{
ho}_t)$$

where  $1 + q_t^p$  is price effect for fractile p based on  $W_t^p$  composition


$$\Rightarrow$$
 long-run steady state:  $sh_W^p = sh_Y^p \cdot \frac{s^p}{s}$ 

where  $sh_W^p$  is fractile p share of wealth,  $sh_Y^p$  is fractile p share of income, and  $s^p/s$  is relative savings rate of fractile p


#### Saving rates typically rise with wealth



## The bottom 90% massively dis-saved in the decade preceding the crisis



## Bottom 90% wealth share decline due to (a) savings collapse, (b) income share fall



Share of income and wealth of bottom 90% wealth holders

Since the 1980s the share of total household wealth owned by families in the bottom 90% of the wealth distribution has fallen proportionally more than the share of total pre-tax national income earned by these families. Source: Appendix Tables B1, B25 and B33c.

	Real growth rate of wealth per family	Real growth rate of income per family	Private saving rate (personal + retained earnings)	Real rate of capital gains	Total pre-tax rate of return
	<b>g</b> <sub>wf</sub>	<b>g</b> yf	s = S/Y	q	r + q
			1917-1929		
All	1.8%	0.5%	10%	0.9%	9.0%
Bottom 90%	-0.4%	0.0%	1%	0.2%	7.9%
Top 10%	2.3%	1.2%	23%	1.0%	9.2%
Top 1%	3.6%	1.4%	28%	1.5%	10.5%
			1929-1986		
All	1.5%	2.0%	12%	-0.6%	6.6%
Bottom 90%	3.0%	2.3%	6%	-0.2%	6.2%
Top 10%	1.0%	1.4%	24%	-0.9%	6.8%
Top 1%	0.3%	0.5%	24%	-1.1%	7.2%
	1986-2012				
All	1.9%	1.3%	9%	0.9%	7.5%
Bottom 90%	0.1%	0.7%	0%	1.3%	7.5%
Top 10%	2.7%	2.3%	22%	0.7%	7.5%
Top 1%	3.9%	3.4%	36%	0.9%	7.9%

#### Table 2: Rates of growth, saving and return by wealth group

### Effects of Savings and Income Inequality

**Bottom 90%:** Since mid-1980s, plummeting savings rate  $s^p$  for bottom 90% relative to aggregate s [due to surge in debt]

 $\Rightarrow$  Decline in bottom 90% wealth share, and expected to continue

**Top 1%:** Since mid-1970s, surge in income share held by top wealth holders and solid savings rate  $s^p$  (relative to aggregate s)

 $\Rightarrow$  Short-run: Large increase in top wealth shares, and expected to continue

 $\Rightarrow$  Long-run: Self-made wealth could become inherited wealth and lead to the "patrimony society" of Piketty (2014)

### Policies to Reduce Wealth Inequality

**Top 1%:** Progressive taxation (income, wealth, inheritance) is a proven historical tool to reduce income/wealth concentration

 $\ensuremath{\mathsf{Progressive}}$  income and wealth tax reduce income and savings incentives at the top

Estate taxation can prevent self-made wealth from becoming inherited wealth

**Bottom 90%:** Collapse in savings due to surge in debt [due to present bias for consumption? stagnating incomes? financial de-regulation?]

 $\Rightarrow$  Middle class income support + financial regulation

 $\Rightarrow$  Need to encourage savings / discourage debt [= nudged savings + borrow against yourself?]

### Conclusion

#### A first step toward DINA

We are constructing new, consistent series on the distribution of wealth W and income  $Y = Y_K + Y_L$  fully consistent with flow of funds and national accounts

Next step: construct a microfile with individual-level income (pre-tax and post-tax) and wealth consistent with macro flow of funds and national income accounts

= distributional national accounts (DINA), reconciling macro growth and inequality studies

#### Need for better wealth and savings data

Using additional data would enable us to refine our estimates:

E.g., matched property and individual income tax data

### Modest additional administrative data collection effort could have high value:

401(k) taccounts balance reporting (and not only IRAs)

Mortgage balances on forms 1098

Market value of portfolio securities on forms 1099

Purchases and sales of securities (to measure saving and consumption)

 $\Rightarrow$  Necessary to obtain fully accurate distributional national accounts

### Supplementary Slides

### Wealth categories definition

**Equities:** corporate equities, including S corporation equities, and money market fund shares (treated as dividend-paying for income tax purposes)


**Fixed claims:** currency, deposits, bonds, and other interest-paying assets, net of non-mortgage debts

**Business assets:** sole proprietorships, farms (land and equipment), partnerships, intellectual property products


**Housing:** owner- and tenant-occupied housing, net of mortgage debt

**Pensions:** funded pension entitlements, life insurance reserves, IRAs. Excludes social security and unfunded defined benefit pensions

#### Rates of returns on wealth around 7% No long-run price effects



#### What tax data miss




### Most trusts generate income taxable at the individual level




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#### Charitable giving follows top incomes $\Rightarrow$ Surge in top incomes is real



Source: The figure depicts average charitable giving of top 1% inomes (normalized by average income per family) on the left y-axis. For comparison, the figure reports the top 1% income share (on the right y-axis).

## Off-Shore Tax evasion, if anything, has probably increased since the 1970s



In 2012, 9% of the U.S. listed equity market capitalization was held by tax haven investors (hedge funds in the Caymans, banks in Switzerland, individuals in Monaco, etc.). Source: Zucman (2014) using US Treasury International Capital data.

## Total returns of foundations grow with wealth but realized returns do not

Figure C4: Return on foundation wealth, 1990-2010 average Returns including realized & unrealized gains

